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ABSTRACT 
The research examines the effect between corporate governance and company-specific 
variables to financial performance among a sample of long-term insurance companies 
in South Africa from 2011 to 2016. The study employed a panel regression technique 
using board size, board independence, audit committee size and CEO tenure as proxies 
for corporate governance while controlling for firm size, reinsurance usage and 
leverage. The proxies used for financial performance were underwriting profits, return 
on assets (ROA) and returns on equity (ROE).  
 
The findings show that board size is the only corporate governance variable that is 
statistically significant with financial performance in the sample of South African long-
term insurance providers. The remaining corporate governance variables did not have 
a statistically significant relationship with financial performance because each 
company in the sample set them in line with the recommendations outlined in the King 
Report IV on Corporate Governance. The implication of the adherence to the 
recommendations in the King Report IV on Corporate Governance reduced the 
variation in corporate governance structures between the companies in the sample. The 
findings also show leverage as the only control variable that is statistically significant 
with financial performance in the sample. 
 
The dissertation recommends that the corporate governance guidelines outlined in the 
King Report IV on Corporate Governance be made statutory in the South African long-
term insurance sector, because these guidelines do not adversely affect the financial 
performance in a statistically significant way. Further, the dissertation recommends a 
board size ceiling be set in the sector to address the observed negative and statistically 
significant relationship between board size and financial performance. Finally, the 
dissertation recommends the use of regulation to limit the amount of leverage that 
companies in the sector can take on to address the observed negative and statistically 
significant relationship between leverage and financial performance. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial Performance, Panel-regression, 
Insurance, South Africa 
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GLOSSARY  
Affirmative Action 
Action favouring those who are from historically discriminated racial groups in South 
Africa. 
Agent 
A person who manages assets they do not own. 
Balanced Board 
A board of directors with an equal number of executive and non-executive directors 
BRICS 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
Cadbury Report of 1992 
A corporate governance framework established in England that focussed on the 
financial aspects of corporate governance 
CIS 
Chartered Institute of Secretaries 
Combined Assurance Model 
A model that optimises assurance coverage from managers, internal and external 
assurance providers on the risks faced by the company 
Companies Act of 2008 
The legal framework that governs business practices in South Africa. 
Corporate Governance 
The rules, practices and processes by which a company is controlled 
Dependent Company 
A company where the largest shareholders do not manage the company on a day-to-
day basis 
Executive Director 
A director who is employed by the company for its day-to-day operations 
Going-concern 
A company being in a position to continue its business operations 
IoD 
Institute of Directors 
Independent Director 
A director without a financial interest in the company and not employed by the 
company for its day-to-day operations 
JSE 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
JSE Main Board 
Where the top 40 stocks on the JSE are traded 
Lead Independent Director 
A member of the board that is independent and provides leadership and advice to the 
board without compromising the chair when they are faced with a conflict of interest 
 
viii 
Long Time Horizon 
A time horizon longer than 60 months 
Nest-Egg 
The cumulative amount of money saved for retirement. 
Non-Executive Director 
A member of the board of directors who is not employed by the company for its day-
to-day operations and has a financial stake in the company 
Principal 
A person who owns assets they do not manage. 
Reinsurance 
The insurance that is purchased by an insurance company 
SACOB 
South African College of Business 
SAICA 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants 
Shadow Banking  
A collection of non-bank financial intermediaries that provide services similar to 
traditional commercial banks but outside normal banking regulations 
Shadow Director 
An individual who is not on the board of directors but whose instruction and direction 
conflict with that of an executive or non-executive director 
Substance over Form 
The economic substance of a transaction over its legal form 
Theory X 
A management theory that suggests workers are motivated using external incentives 
Theory Y 
A management theory that suggests workers are motivated internally 
Two-Tier Board 
A board of directors structure with two separate groups of directors i.e. an executive 
and supervisory board with distinct functions 
Unitary Board 
A board of directors structure with one group of directors
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
In South Africa, long-term insurance consists of life cover, funeral insurance, 
retirement annuities, disability cover, medical insurance and hospital plans (Financial 
Services Board (FSB), 2017). The insured buy this insurance to protect against events 
that change their ability to generate income such as severe injury, health failure, 
retirement or death. 
 
The structure of long-term insurance products is based on premiums that are paid to the 
insurance company over an extended time horizon before the insured client claims a 
pay-out. The danger embedded in such products is the potential mismanagement of the 
premiums received by the insurance company, especially for those with weak, 
corporate governance structures. 
 
The mismanagement of premiums can affect the insured through a delay in payment, 
partial payment or a total non-payment of their claims. In effect exposing the insured 
to financial risks that they believed were covered. 
 
An instance of corporate governance failure in South Africa occurred in 2017 with 
Steinhoff International Holdings NV. An accounting scandal that required the 
restatement of the company's financial statements was the peak of its corporate 
governance failure (Cronje, 2018). The implication of the scandal was a decrease in the 
market value of the company from 5581 cents per share on 2nd December 2017 to 129 
cents per share on 30th June 2017 (INET BFA Database, 2018). The decrease in the 
share price represents a 97% loss of market value in the company and consequently, to 
its shareholders. 
 
The decrease in market value in Steinhoff International Holdings NV affected 
institutional investors such as pension funds. Pension funds manage assets on behalf of 
beneficiaries to provide them with an income or nest egg after retirement. Therefore, 
the corporate governance failure in Steinhoff Holdings International NV not only 
affected the company but the ability of pension funds to meet their financial return 
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requirements. For this reason, the research looks to empirically examine the impact that 
corporate governance has on financial performance in South Africa’s long-term 
insurance industry because corporate governance failure has economic and social 
consequences. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Multiple studies support the notion that the development of the long-term insurance 
industry is positively related to development measured by GDP growth (Kugler & 
Ofoghi, 2005; Haiss & Sumegi, 2008; Lee, 2011 and Chen, Lee & Lee, 2012). 
Outreville (1996) explained the relationship arises because insurance reduces the risk 
of financial loss associated with investment hence encouraging investment activity. The 
implication of this relationship is the profitability of the insurance sector is important 
to an economy’s development because profits facilitate the growth of the industry. 
 
Research findings by Olajide (2013) and Najjar (2012) in Nigeria and Bahrain 
respectively show corporate governance enhances the profitability of insurance 
companies. In South Africa, the suggested corporate governance framework is the King 
Report IV on Corporate Governance. This framework is applicable to every company 
with a listed financial security on the JSE but only a recommendation for other 
companies. Therefore private long-term insurance providers in the country are not 
obligated to follow the guidelines outlined in the King Report IV on Corporate 
Governance. Therefore, public and private long-term insurers may use different 
corporate governance structures. The differences in structure may affect the 
profitability of the industry. 
 
During the period 2013 to 2015 the South African long-term insurance industry’s 
profitability has been weak (Alexander Forbes, 2015). The weak profitability coincided 
with GDP growth rates of 2.4852%, 1.8470% and 1.2795% (Thomson Reuters Eikon, 
2018a) compared to the average GDP growth rates of 4.2842%, 3.5603% and 1.9912% 
in the comparable BRICS countries (Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2018b). This observation 
immediately leads to two questions. The first, could an improvement in the profitability 
of the long-term insurance industry act as a catalyst to get South Africa’s GDP growth 
rate closer to the BRICS average? The second, how does corporate governance affect 
the profitability of long-term insurers in South Africa. 
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In light of low GDP growth and weak profitability in the long-term insurance industry. 
The dissertation will investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 
profitability in South Africa’s long-term insurance industry. 
1.3 Research Questions 
The dissertation has two research questions that arise from corporate governance and 
financial performance, these are: 
 Does corporate governance affect the financial performance of long-term 
insurance providers in South Africa? 
 Do company-specific factors affect the financial performance of long-term 
insurance providers in South Africa? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The study sets out to examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
financial performance by using corporate governance and company-specific factors. 
Therefore, the study has primary and secondary objectives. 
Primary objectives 
 To examine the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance for long-term insurance providers in South Africa. 
 To highlight the corporate governance variables that need to be prioritised by 
long-term insurance providers in South Africa. 
Secondary objective 
 To examine the relationship between company-specific factors and financial 
performance for long-term insurance providers in South Africa. 
1.5 Research Hypotheses 
The dissertation examines two hypotheses. The first hypothesis empirically tests the 
relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. The second 
hypothesis empirically tests the relationship between company-specific factors and 
financial performance. 
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Hypothesis 1 
H0: there is a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance for long-term insurance providers in South Africa. 
H1: there is no statistically significant relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance for long-term insurance providers in South Africa. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
H0:   there is a statistically significant relationship between company-specific 
factors and financial performance for long-term insurance providers in South 
Africa. 
H1:  there is no statistically significant relationship between company-specific 
factors and financial performance for long-term insurance providers in South 
Africa. 
1.6 Justification of Research 
The research looks to add to the academic literature on the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance. Further, corporate governance 
regulators, institutional investors and insurance companies can make use of this 
research. 
 
The IoD (2016) through King IV Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa 
2016 aims to achieve effective and ethical leadership. To meet its aim the King IV 
Report's objectives are to highlight strong performance, effective control, legitimacy 
and an ethical culture. The research can help companies in South Africa's long-term 
insurance industry achieve a stronger financial performance by providing empirical 
evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. 
 
Institutional investors, in the form of active asset managers, look to achieve higher than 
benchmark returns on a risk-adjusted basis. The research can help by highlighting the 
corporate governance factors that influence financial performance in long-term 
insurance providers in South Africa. 
Insurance companies could use the research to optimise their corporate governance 
structures for financial performance. 
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1.7 Organisation of the Study 
The dissertation consists of five chapters. The first is the introduction, followed by the 
literature review, methodology, findings and discussion of results, and conclusion and 
recommendations. 
 
The literature review provides an in-depth overview of the research area selected. The 
review covers four areas; the South African long-term insurance market, corporate 
governance theories, the corporate governance framework in South Africa and 
empirical literature. The methodology provides an outline of the method used to 
conduct the research. The section describes; the research approach and strategy, 
sampling method, analytical framework, estimation technique, research reliability, 
estimation technique validity and the limitations of the study. The chapter on the 
discussion of findings presents the results obtained from the analysis and the 
interpretation of these results. The results discussed relate to; descriptive statistics, 
correlations between the variables and regression results. The conclusion and 
recommendations present insight gained from the previous section and how these 
findings can be used to help corporate governance regulators improve corporate 
governance policies in South Africa’s long-term insurance market. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The chapter presents the scholarship relating to corporate governance and financial 
performance. The review manages the broad scope of corporate governance by focusing 
on theories on the topic and the framework and legislation used in South Africa. 
 
The chapter comprises five subsections after the introduction. The first is an overview 
of South Africa's long-term insurance market. The second is an explanation of the 
theoretical underpinning of corporate governance. The third describes the practice of 
corporate governance in South Africa. The fourth examines prior academic literature 
relating to the topic, and finally, there is a conclusion to the chapter. 
2.2 Overview of South African Long-Term Insurance Market 
The FSB (2018) reports having 79 registered long-term insurance providers in South 
Africa. For the sake of this overview of the South African long-term insurance industry, 
we limit this investigation to 18 of these registered companies. The KPMG South 
African Insurance Survey 2017 uses 18 companies (KPMG, 2017), hence imposing this 
limitation. 
 
The reported value of assets controlled by the South African long-term insurance 
industry in 2016 is R2 314 billion. The four largest insurers in the sector by total assets 
in 2016 are, Old Mutual Emerging Markets Limited, Sanlam Limited, MMI Holdings 
Limited and Liberty Limited. These insurers control 94% of the assets held by the 
industry, implying a concentrated industry. 
 
Competition and income elasticity respectively, characterised the lower and higher 
income segments of the industry in 2016. In the lower segments, competition from 
direct insurers lowered client retention rates, while the macroeconomic environment 
highlighted the income elasticity in higher segments revealed by the decrease in the 
number of policyholders. 
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In 2016 a decrease in profit before tax of 11% in the industry was observed when 
compared to 2015. The poor performance of the South African equity market in the 
year and the strengthening of the Rand against leading currencies (i.e. United States 
Dollar, British Pound and Euro) drove the negative performance. The impact of the 
weak performance of the South African equity market resulted in reduced fees from the 
asset management parts of the business. The strengthening Rand meant earnings 
generated by foreign subsidiaries offshore fell in Rand terms. The figure below 
highlights the performance of the South African long-term insurance industry in 2016 
relative to 2015. 
Table 1: Snapshot of South African Long-term Insurance Industry 
 2016 
R billion 
2015 
R billion 
Profit before tax 38 43 
Tax 12 14 
Effective tax rate (%) 31% 32% 
Total assets 2314 2300 
Administration, management and other expenses 75 73 
Policyholder liabilities for insurance and discretionary contracts 721 730 
Policy liabilities for investment contracts 1126 1078 
SOURCE: KPMG South African Insurance Industry Survey 2017 
2.3 Corporate Governance Theories 
The subsection presents academic thinking relating to corporate governance. The ideas 
highlighted are of agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory and 
stakeholder theory.  
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
Agency is a contractual relationship where a principal (owner) engages single or 
multiple agents (managers) to make decisions on their behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), McGregor (1960). Theory X of organisational behaviour is the basis of the 
principal-agent relationship observed between shareholders and executive management 
teams. Spremann (1987) presented agency theory as one where the agent (executive 
management) takes decisions that do not benefit the principal (shareholders) of the 
company. An example of an action in line with the theory is seeking financial 
compensation above the industry average. The reason for the agent acting in their own 
interest over that of the principal is misaligned incentives. The example above shows 
an agent’s compensation is tied to gross profit margins while the principal’s is to after-
tax profits. The misaligned incentive structure gives rise to a moral hazard, referred to 
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as the principal-agent problem (Ross, 1973). The implication of this theory on financial 
performance is that a company should have greater oversight of its executive team to 
address the principal-agent problem. Therefore, this theory assumes the executive team 
of a company is motivated exclusively by financial reward. 
2.3.2 Stewardship Theory 
Donaldson (1990) explains stewardship as a situation where an agent's (manager) 
actions are in alignment with the interests of the principal (shareholder) McGregor 
(1960). Theory Y of organisational behaviour is the basis of stewardship theory. A 
recent investigation by April, Kukard and Peters (2013) present stewardship theory as 
one where the agent makes management decisions in a way that benefits the principal 
of the company. An example of an action in line with the theory is seeking financial 
compensation in line with, or slightly below, the industry average. The reason for the 
agent acting in alignment with the principal's interests could be that the agent is 
concurrently a principal. 
 
The Stewardship theory's impact on financial performance is less oversight of the 
executive management team. Therefore, this theory assumes the executive management 
team of a company is motivated by more than only financial reward. 
2.3.3 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence from a company perspective suggests the external resources 
available to a company determine the activities it can perform. Pfeffer (1972) 
investigated this idea through the lens of corporate mergers. 
 
A recent investigation by Dobbin and Schoonhoven (2010) presents resource 
dependence theory as one where a company’s structure and strategy are influenced by 
the resource flows available to it. An example of a resource flow available to a company 
is human capital in the form of a knowledge worker. The reason behind company 
structure and strategy being influenced by human capital arises from productivity 
differences. Workers with higher amounts of human capital tend to be more productive 
than those with lower amounts. Therefore, they require less oversight than their 
counterparts. The lower level of oversight may culminate in a less bureaucratic 
company structure and strategy in order to leverage a higher level of productivity.  
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The implication of this theory on financial performance is that a company should look 
to maximise the expertise and social capital on its board in order to increase the 
resources available to the company. For this reason, the resource dependence theory 
assumes that all the expertise and social capital held by board members will be provided 
to the company. 
2.3.4 Stakeholder Theory 
Freeman (2010) present stakeholder theory as one where groups influence a company’s 
strategy and whose support is critical to the existence of the company but does not 
encompass the entirety of society. The implication of the theory on corporate 
governance is that a company should aim to cater to the interests of all its stakeholders. 
The reason for this is to incentivise each key stakeholder to act in the interest of the 
company. Therefore, this theory assumes the shareholder is not the only stakeholder in 
the company. 
2.4 Corporate Governance in South Africa 
The subsection highlights the framework that underpins corporate governance in South 
Africa. This framework is the King Report IV on Corporate Governance. The 
subsection shows the evolution of the King Report from the first publication in 1994 to 
the recent publication in 2016. 
 
The King Report I on Corporate Governance for South Africa, which was presented in 
1994, is the seminal formal framework for corporate governance in the country. The 
report was established to create a framework of corporate governance especially for 
dependent companies not to focus exclusively on control to the detriment of 
entrepreneurial enterprise. The rationale behind King Committee’s (1994) decision was 
that emerging market economies depend on entrepreneurs to take business risks and 
initiative. 
  
The King Committee, at the request of the IoD, established it with the support of 
SACOB, CIS, SAICA, JSE and The South African Institute of Business Ethics (King 
Committee, 1994). The Cadbury Report of 1992 in England influenced the King Report 
I. The King Report I expanded on the scope of the Cadbury Report of 1992 to include 
a Code of Ethical Practices and consider the ‘special circumstances’ in South Africa, in 
addition to the financial aspects of corporate governance (King Committee, 1994). 
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The King Committee (1994) outlined the 'special circumstances' as a lack of human 
capital in the country and, more importantly, the rise of the entrepreneur from 
disadvantaged communities. The lack of human capital brought about a lack of 
separation in the positions of Board Chair and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and a 
lack of credible independent directors to fill the role of non-executive board members 
(King Committee, 1994).  
 
In 2002, the King Report II on Corporate Governance for South Africa was presented. 
The report was an update to the corporate governance guidelines for affected companies 
in South Africa. The changing business environment in the country was the reason for 
modernising the report. The report increased the scope of institutions affected to include 
every company with tradable securities on the JSE and public enterprises that fall under 
the Public Finance Management Act and Local Government. 
 
In 2009 the King Report III on Corporate Governance for South Africa was presented. 
The report was an update to the corporate governance guidelines aimed to limit 
inconsistencies between the report of 2002 and the Companies Act of 2008. The 
resultant update of the King Report III affected guidelines for the board of directors and 
audit committee.  
 
In 2016 the King Report IV on Corporate Governance for South Africa was presented. 
The report was an update to the corporate governance guidelines in South Africa and 
aimed to embed seventeen corporate governance principles in corporate practice. The 
implication of the report was an increase in the scope of affected institutions to 
encompass every entity operating in the country.  
 
The IoD (2016) outlined seventeen corporate governance principles. The objectives of 
these principles were to steer and set a company’s strategic direction, obtain policy 
approval and planning, oversee and monitor the company, and ensure accountability in 
the company. The table below presents the differences between the four King Reports 
on Corporate Governance with a focus on board and audit committee functions. 
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Table 2: The Evolution of King Report 
 King Report I on 
Corporate Governance 
(1994) 
King Report II on Corporate Governance 
(2002) 
King Report III on Corporate Governance (2009) King Report IV on 
Corporate Governance 
(2016) 
Applicable entities Companies listed on the 
JSE main board, Large 
public entities, Banks, 
Financial and insurance 
entities, Large unlisted 
public companies. 
Every company trading securities on the JSE, 
Public enterprises that fall under the Public 
Finance Management Act and Local 
Government, Banks, Financial and insurance 
companies, Large unlisted public companies. 
Every company trading securities on the JSE, 
Public enterprises that fall under the Public Finance 
Management Act and Local Government, 
Banks, Financial and insurance companies, 
Large unlisted public companies. 
Every entity operating in 
South Africa 
Scope of report Directors, auditors, 
stakeholder links, ethics 
and compliance 
Directors, risk management, audit, stakeholder 
links, sustainability, ethics and compliance 
Directors, risk management, audit, stakeholder links, 
sustainability, ethics and compliance 
Directors, risk management, 
audit, stakeholder links, 
sustainability, ethics and 
compliance 
Recommended board 
structure 
Unitary Unitary Unitary Unitary 
Type of board members Executive and Non-
executive 
Executive and Non-executive Executive and Non-executive Executive and Non-executive 
Functions of directors Oversight and setting 
company strategy, 
Individually and 
collectively responsibility 
to shareholders, 
Ensure the company is a 
going-concern. 
Oversight and setting company strategy, 
Individually and collectively responsibility to 
shareholders, Ensure the company is a going-
concern, Risk management in the company, 
Create and enforce a code that addresses 
conflicts of interest, State the assumptions 
used to rate a company as a going-concern, 
Identify a company’s key performance and 
risk indicators. 
Oversight and setting company strategy, 
Individually and collectively responsibility to 
shareholders, Ensure the company is a going-concern, 
Concurrently consider risk management, performance 
and sustainability in the company, Create and enforce a 
code that addresses conflicts of interest, State the 
assumptions used to rate a company as a going-
concern, Identify a company’s key performance and 
risk indicators. 
Similar to King Report III on 
Corporate Governance (2009) 
but with a focus on integrated 
thinking that encompasses; 
Stakeholder inclusivity, 
Corporate citizenship, The 
role of the organisation in 
society.  
Function(s) of audit 
committee 
Provision of information Provision of information Provision of information Provision of information 
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The King Committee (1994), IoD (2002), IoD (2009) and IoD (2016) recommends the 
use of a unitary board structure over a two-tier board structure. The recommendation 
looks to prevent artificial compartmentalisation of business activities. To meet the 
functions of oversight and setting company strategy, the report recommended the board 
of directors should meet once a quarter each year, furthermore they should be in a 
position to lead and oversee the company. Additionally, they should be bound by duties 
of loyalty and of care and skill and have an equal number of executive and non-
executive board members. Moreover, the board should preferably have an independent 
chair – or two very high calibre non-executive directors – and set a company system 
for worker participation (King Committee, 1994). 
 
To achieve these objectives the report recommended the following tasks to executive 
and non-executive directors. First, they should perform in a proper manner and be 
informed about the company’s affairs. Additionally, they should never permit a conflict 
of interest and should only make decisions on behalf of the company with sufficient 
information. Moreover, they should disclose potential conflicts of interest, act 
independently, and strive to increase shareholder value. Equally important is a need to 
report to stakeholders using the standard of substance over form, act with integrity and 
in the interest of the company in company dealings. At the same time, to use their 
expertise for the company’s benefit, get board approval for corporate strategy, and use 
independent professional legal advice when faced with uncertainty. Finally, they should 
ensure the company prepares and follows annual budgets, has an affirmative action plan 
and treat information learnt as a director as confidential (King Committee, 1994). 
 
The information the audit committee is expected to provide relates to company assets, 
accounting records and internal control systems. To fulfil this function the committee 
recommended a non-executive director should chair the audit committee. Furthermore, 
the audit committee should provide committee meeting minutes to senior management, 
external auditors and internal auditors and communicate freely with the Chair, CEO 
and Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Moreover, they should consult independent experts 
at the company’s expense when required, and have the external auditor, internal auditor 
and CFO present at all committee meetings. Finally, the committee should preferably 
consist of a majority of non-executive directors (King Committee, 1994). 
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The IoD (2002) provided additional guidelines. These guidelines discourage shadow 
directors, and should state their capacity (i.e. executive, non-executive or independent) 
in the annual report. Committee members should be prepared and able where necessary 
to express disagreement with colleagues on the board and be prohibited from dealing 
in company securities for a period before the announcement of financial results for 
directors of JSE listed companies (IoD, 2002). 
 
The guidelines to the audit committee recommend that committee members should be 
financially literate and able to provide the current terms of reference of the committee 
to shareholders on demand. Additionally, they should expect external auditors to 
express an individual opinion on the company and, discuss the company with external 
auditors at least once a year without the executive team. Furthermore, they should avoid 
opinion ‘shopping’ on accounting matters from external auditors, have formal terms of 
reference, and seek approval from shareholders on the appointment of external auditors. 
Finally, the committee should be periodically monitored by the board (IoD, 2002). 
 
The IoD (2009) updated guidelines for the board of directors in light of the amended 
Companies Act of 2008, and recommended the board of directors consider risk, 
performance and sustainability simultaneously. These considerations meant leadership 
of the company should have an ethical foundation and, be responsible for information 
technology governance. Additionally, they should appreciate that stakeholder 
perception affects the company’s reputation. Finally, they should assign the CEO and 
establish a framework for delegation of duties and have an independent chair or a lead 
independent director. 
 
The updated guidelines for the audit committee, in light of the amended companies act, 
recommended that the audit committee should consist of members who have experience 
in the role and are financially literate, able to oversee integrated reporting and to use a 
combined assurance model in all assurance activities. 
2.5 Prior Research Literature 
The subsection examines academic research on the topic of corporate governance and 
financial performance. The financial performance metrics reviewed against corporate 
governance are profitability and efficiency. 
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2.5.1 Corporate Efficiency and Corporate Governance 
The topic on the relationship between corporate efficiency and corporate governance 
in the insurance industry has been written on extensively in various parts of the world. 
The region that saw the relationship investigated in great detail was Asia, with work 
carried out by Wang, Jeng and Peng (2007), Huang, Hsiao and Lai (2007) and Hsu and 
Petchsakulwong (2010) in Taiwan. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 may have acted 
as a catalyst to obtain empirical knowledge on the subject in the region. In South Africa, 
Boakye (2018) examined this relationship because the author identified the insurance 
and pension industries as those that require greater corporate governance scrutiny since 
they manage large pools of public capital. 
 
The prevailing methodology in the three studies cited above is panel regression. Only 
Wang et al. (2007) used a multiple linear regression as a methodology because their 
research considered a single year. The three studies made use of panel regression as the 
second phase of the methodology after data envelope analysis (DEA) that was used to 
obtain a score that encompassed technical, allocative and cost efficiency. The study by 
Wen-Yen Hsu and Pongpitch Petchsakulwong (2010) also included revenue efficiency. 
 
DEA is a mathematical programming technique that does not make assumptions on the 
input and output variables used in the analytical process (Cummins & Weiss, 2013). 
The objective of the analysis is to create a frontier that shows the score that the most 
efficient company would get given a defined set of circumstances (Cummins & Weiss, 
2013). Each of the studies in Asia used a different set of input and output variables to 
calculate their efficiency score. Below is an illustration of the variables used by Huang 
et al. (2007) and Wang et al. (2007) who carried out studies in the same year. 
 
The input and output variables for the DEA used in Huang et al. (2007) were; premiums 
for life annuities, health and accident, and group insurance as outputs and equity; with 
leverage, personnel expenses and personnel expenses per capita as inputs. Conversely, 
Wang et al. (2007) used benefit payments to individual alive, personal accident, health 
and group insurance, and increase in life policy reserve as inputs for the life insurance 
industry. On the other hand, number of office hour labour, number of agent labour, 
equity capital and unit of business service were used as outputs. For the property-
liability insurance industry, the inputs used were; losses incurred and investment, while 
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the outputs were; number of labour, unit of business service, debt and equity. The 
difference in the variables does not undermine either score. Therefore, it does not 
negatively impact the reliability of the results obtained from either study. 
 
The results obtained from the study by Huang et al. (2007) showed that ownership 
concentration and board independence is positively and statistically significantly 
related to insurance company efficiency. The result with regard to ownership 
concentration suggests directors in Taiwanese insurance companies act in accordance 
with the stewardship theory. Filatotchev, Lien and Piesse (2004) found that directors 
and supervisors of directors on Taiwanese company boards are required to own shares 
of the company’s board they serve. The requirement shows the positive relationship has 
its foundation in agency theory.  
 
The results from Huang et al. (2007) with regard to board independence are supported 
by Hardwick, Adams and Zou (2011) in the United Kingdom life insurance industry 
(UK); Huang, Lai, McNamara and Wang (2011) in the United States of America (USA) 
property-liability insurance industry; and Hsu and Petchsakulwong (2010) in the 
Thailand non-life insurance industry. The results found by Wang et al. (2007) found 
the opposite relationship between board independence and corporate efficiency. 
 
The research conducted by Boakye (2018) made use of management expenditure, sales 
and administration costs, total debt and total equity as inputs. The rationale for Boakye 
(2018) inputs stem from arguments made by Eling and Luhnen (2010). The argument 
suggests that the inputs for the life insurance market can be grouped into labour and 
business services, debt capital and equity capital. The outputs used in Boakye (2018) 
were; incurred benefits and invested assets. The rationale for these outputs also stems 
from arguments made by Eling and Luhnen (2010) that insurance companies play a key 
role in risk-pooling and financial intermediation. 
 
Boakye’s (2018) findings with regard to non-executive directorship, and by extension 
board independence, is negatively and statistically significantly related to insurance 
company efficiency. The result suggests executive directors in the South African long-
term insurance companies act in accordance with stakeholder theory. The study further 
found audit committee size is positively and statistically significantly related to 
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insurance company efficiency. The result suggests that audit committees in South 
African life insurance companies are beneficiaries of the expertise contained in larger 
committee sizes, thereby adhering to the resource dependence theory. Boakye’s (2018) 
findings with regard to board independence are at odds with similar studies carried out 
by Hardwick, Adams and Zou (2011) as well as Huang, Lai, McNamara and Wang 
(2011) in the UK and the USA respectively. However, the result is supported by Kader, 
Adams and Hardwick (2010) in the Middle East. The difference in results could be due 
to emerging economies having a smaller pool of suitable non-executive board 
candidates in comparison with developed economies. 
 
Wang et al. (2007) uses multiple linear regression on cross-sectional data. This method 
limits the reliability of an interpretation of these results beyond the time period they 
investigated. Kader, Adams and Hardwick (2010) in the Middle Eastern ‘takaful’ 
(insurance) industry and Boubakri, Dionne and Triki (2008) in the USA insurance 
industry obtained similar findings providing anecdotal validity to Wang et al. (2007). 
2.5.2 Corporate Profitability and Corporate Governance 
The relationship between corporate profitability and corporate governance in the 
insurance industry has been written on extensively in various parts of the world. The 
region that saw the relationship investigated in great detail was Africa with work carried 
out by Olajide (2013) in Nigeria, Alhassan, Addison and Asamoah (2015) and Asare, 
Alhassan, Asamoah and Ntow-Gyamfi (2017) both in Ghana. 
 
The methodology in each of the studies cited above is panel regression. Three of the 
four studies used: return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as the proxy for 
corporate profitability. Torres-Reyna (2007) explains panel analysis as an econometric 
technique used for analysing cross-sectional and longitudinal data and makes 
assumptions on the variables used in the analytical process. A panel analysis could be 
carried out by using fixed effects or random effects. Torres-Reyna (2007) goes on to 
explain that a fixed effects analysis assumes that unobserved factors between the 
dependent and independent variables are constant, while unobserved factors are not 
constant in a random-effects analysis. 
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The independent variables used in each study had a variation in the corporate 
governance proxies used in the panel regression. Olajide (2013) used: board size; CEO 
duality; institutional ownership; audit committee size; dividend pay-out ratio; number 
of shareholders in the company; and, annual general meeting (AGM). Alhassan et al. 
(2015) used: market structure proxies in the form of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
(HHI) and concentration ratios; ROA; firm size; underwriting risk; leverage; GDP 
growth rate; and, inflation rate. Asare et al. (2017) used: ROA, underwriting profit, 
Value Added Intellectual Capital (VAICTM), human capital efficiency, structural capital 
efficiency, capital employed efficiency, risk, firm size and leverage. 
 
Olajide (2013) found a positive and statistically significant relationship between board 
size and financial profitability. The finding is in accordance with the resource 
dependence theory. Almajali, Alamaro and Al-Soub (2012) support the existence of 
resource dependence theory in the insurance industry through its conclusion that 
management expertise had a positive impact on ROA for insurance companies listed 
on the Amman stock exchange. Akotey et al. (2013) contradicted Olajide (2013) and 
Almajali, Alamaro and Al-Soub (2012) with their results of a negative relationship 
between management expenses and sales profitability in Ghana's life insurance 
industry. Najjar (2012), in the Bahraini insurance industry, provides further support to 
Olajide (2013).  
 
Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) conducted a similar study in the Thailand life-
insurance industry but found no relationship between board size and corporate 
profitability. Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) used a multiple linear regression 
using cross-sectional data. This method limits the reliability of an interpretation of their 
results beyond the time period they investigated. 
2.6 Conclusion 
There is abundant empirical evidence that suggests there is a relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate performance. The implication of the abundance of 
literature is a lack of an explicit knowledge gap. Existing literature does not provide 
consistent results on the relationship between corporate governance variables such as 
board independence and size with corporate performance.  
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Huang et al. (2007), Huang, Lai, McNamara and Wang (2011), Hardwick, Adams and 
Zou (2011) and Hsu and Petchsakulwong (2010) found a positive relationship between 
board independence and corporate performance while Kader, Adams and Hardwick 
(2010) and Boubakri, Dionne and Triki (2008) found the opposite to be true. The 
relationship between board size and corporate performance in previous studies had 
similar contradictions. Olajide (2013) and Najjar (2012) found a positive relationship 
between board size and corporate performance while Connelly and Limpaphayom 
(2004) found a negative one. 
 
The contradictions within the results of these studies justify further investigation into 
the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance. The 
research will add to the literature on the topic to help clarify the nature of this 
relationship. The investigation will be carried out on the South African long-term 
insurance industry. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter has seven subsections after the introduction. The first is an overview of the 
sampling method and the data period. The second is an explanation of the research 
approach and strategy used to carry out the research. The third is an explanation of the 
analytical framework used to satisfy the objectives of the research. The fourth is a 
justification of the estimation technique used in the study. The fifth and the sixth are 
justifications for the reliability and validity of the research method used to conduct the 
research respectively. Finally, a presentation of the limitations of the research method 
is provided. 
3.2 Research Approach and Strategy 
The study uses a descriptive research design to deduce the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance in South Africa’s long-term insurance 
market. A quantitative approach is used to carry out the research. The data comes from 
a secondary source, the published annual reports of each company.  
3.3 Sampling Method and Data Period 
The study makes use of purposive sampling of long-term insurance providers in South 
Africa for the years 2011 – 2016. The subsection begins by explaining the rationale 
behind the sampling method and then closes by explaining the rationale behind the data 
period used to conduct the research. 
3.3.1 Sampling Method 
A non-probability sampling method, being convenience sampling, is used to ensure that 
the sample does not have missing data. The convenience sampling method was chosen 
to avoid statistical bias arising from missing data. The missing data would require 
mathematical adjustments to correctly interpret the results from the analysis.  
3.3.2 Data Period 
2011 to 2016 is the data period selected to carry out the research. The two reasons for 
selecting this period are one, it is representative of the current economic environment 
faced by long-term insurance providers in the South African economy; and two, it 
contains all the necessary data points to carry out the analysis. 
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3.4 Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework used to conduct the research is a regression. The variables 
used to perform the regression are: ROA; ROE; board size; board independence; audit 
committee size; CEO tenure; firm size; reinsurance usage; and, financial leverage. 
 
The subsection begins by explaining the regression equation. Following this is a 
description of the regression equation variables. The conclusion is a description of how 
the regression equation variables are measured. 
3.4.1 Regression Equation 
The regression method used to analyse the data for the research is a panel regression. 
Olajide (2013), Akotey, Sackey, Amoah and Manso (2013) used the same method to 
conduct similar studies. There are three reasons for selecting this type of analytical 
method as proposed by Hsiao (2003). The first assumes heterogeneous observations; 
the importance of this assumption is it helps to mitigate against biased results. 
 
The second reason assumes the method provides more information on the data and its 
variability and less collinearity among variables. The data are longitudinal panel 
regressions that would help reduce the effect of collinearity of the variables because 
they move together through time. 
 
The third reason assumes the method is better than multiple linear regression for 
studying relationships that appear to be stable. Corporate governance variables appear 
to be stable because they need shareholder approval to change. The formal regression 
equation is presented below. 
 
𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑓𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where 𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡 denotes the financial performance in the form of ROA and ROE of the 
long-term insurer, 𝑖 and year, 𝑡; , 𝑏𝑠 refers to board size; , 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑 refers to the proportion 
of non-executive board members; , 𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 refers to audit committee size; , 𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑡 refers 
to CEO tenure; 𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑 denotes audit committee independence; , 𝑓𝑠 refers to firm size; 
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, 𝑟𝑖𝑢 denotes reinsurance usage and , 𝑙𝑒𝑣 refers to financial leverage of the insurance 
provider. 
 
The remainder of the section continues with a statistical description of the regression 
variables. The second is a test for perfect collinearity in the regression variables to meet 
the assumption of imperfect collinearity of independent variables. The omission of one 
of the perfectly correlated variables will ensure imperfect collinearity. The third is an 
analysis of the nature of the relationship in the independent variables to meet the 
assumption of linear parameters. Any non-linear variable will be mathematically 
transformed to ensure that it is linear. 
3.4.2 Description of Dependent Variables 
The study employs three proxies for financial performance for long-term insurance 
companies: they are underwriting profits (undp), return on equity (ROE) and return on 
assets (ROA). 
 
 Underwriting Profits (undp)  
The financial return obtained from the premiums relative to the long-term insurance 
provider’s asset base. The company’s annual financial statements are the source of this 
data. Underwriting profits are expected to improve an insurance company’s financial 
performance. 
 
 Return on Equity (roe) 
The financial return obtained by equity holders in the long-term insurance provider. 
The company’s annual financial statements are the source of this data. 
 
 Return on Assets (roa) 
The financial return on the total assets held by the long-term insurance provider. The 
company’s annual financial statements are the source of this data. 
3.4.3 Description of Independent Variables 
The study employs four proxies for corporate governance and three control variables. 
The corporate governance proxies are; board size (bs), board independence (bind), audit 
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committee size (acsize) and CEO tenure (ceot). The control variables are firm size (lfs), 
reinsurance usage (riu) and leverage (lev). 
 
 Board Size (bs)  
The number of executive and non-executive directors on the board of directors. The 
company’s annual report is the source of this data. Through the lens of the resource 
dependence theory, a larger board size is expected to improve the financial performance 
of insurance companies. The positive relationship arises because the company would 
have access to a larger pool of expertise to govern it. Olajide (2013) and Najjar (2012) 
found results that confirmed this expectation while Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) 
did not. 
 
 Board Independence (bind)  
The proportion of non-executive board members in the board of directors. The 
company’s annual report is the source of this data. Through the lens of agency theory, 
a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board is expected to improve the 
financial performance of insurance companies. The positive relationship arises because 
of the increased oversight of executive directors. Huang et al. (2007), Huang, Lai, 
McNamara and Wang (2011), Hardwick, Adams and Zou (2011) and Hsu and 
Petchsakulwong (2010) found results that confirmed this expectation while Kader et al. 
(2010) and Boubakri et al. (2008) did not. 
 
 Audit Committee Size (acsize)  
The number of members on the audit committee of the long-term insurance provider. 
The company’s annual report is the source of this data. Through the lens of the resource 
dependence theory, a larger audit committee size is expected to improve the financial 
performance of insurance companies. The positive relationship arises because the 
company would have access to a larger pool of expertise to carry out the audit function. 
Olajide (2013) found results that confirmed this expectation. 
 
 CEO Tenure (ceot)  
The number of years the CEO has been in position in the long-term insurance provider. 
The company’s annual report is the source of this data. Through the lens of stewardship 
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theory, a CEO with a longer tenure is expected to improve financial performance in 
insurance companies. The positive relationship arises because the CEO is believed to 
act in the interest of the company and not to maximise personal financial gain. Adams 
and Jiang (2016) found results that confirmed this expectation. 
 
 Firm Size (lfs)  
The value of assets held by the long-term insurance provider. The company’s annual 
financial statements are the source of this data. Through the lens of economies of scale, 
an increase in company size is expected to improve financial performance in insurance 
companies. The positive relationship arises because an increase in company size 
reduces average fixed and variable costs. Najjar (2012) and Adams and Jiang (2016) 
found results that support this expectation. 
 
 Reinsurance Usage (riu) 
A situation when the long-term insurance provider makes use of reinsurance. The 
company’s annual financial statements are the source of this data. The use of 
reinsurance by insurance companies is expected to improve financial performance. The 
positive relationship arises because reinsurance has a negative relationship with its 
claims pay-out function. Wang et al. (2007) found results that confirmed this 
relationship but they were not statistically significant. 
 
 Leverage (lev) 
The level of debt used by the long-term insurance provider. The company’s annual 
financial statements are the source of this data. Leverage is expected to have an 
ambiguous relationship with financial performance in insurance companies. The 
expectation is ambiguous because leverage augments gains and losses.  
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Table 3: Measurement of Regression Variables 
VARIABLE TYPE OF VARIABLE MEASUREMENT UNIT OF MEASUREMENT 
Financial Performance Variables 
Return on Assets (ROA) Dependent Quantitative Profit after tax / Total assets Ratio 
Return on Equity (ROE) Dependent Quantitative Profit after tax / Equity Ratio 
Underwriting Profits (undp) Dependent Quantitative Underwriting Profit / Total assets Ratio 
Governance Variables 
Board Size (bs) Independent Quantitative Number of directors sitting on the board Integer 
Board Independence (bind) Independent Quantitative Number of non-executive board members / Total 
number of board members 
Ratio 
Audit Committee Size (acsize) Independent Quantitative Number of members in the audit committee Integer 
CEO Tenure (ceot) Independent Quantitative Number of years CEO has been running the firm Integer 
Control variables  
Firm Size (lfs) Independent Quantitative The natural log of the firm’s asset base Integer 
Reinsurance Usage (riu) Independent Quantitative Reinsurance / Gross Premiums Ratio 
Leverage (lev) Independent Quantitative Long-term debts / Total assets Ratio 
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3.5 Estimation Technique 
The research analysis will make use of pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects 
estimation techniques. The methodology is in line with similar studies conducted by 
Olajide (2013), Akotey and Sackey (2013) and Najjar (2012). Below is a presentation 
of the regression equation of a pooled OLS estimation technique. 
 
𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑓𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
The estimation technique assumes E (μ) = 0 and var (μ) = δ2. The assumption implies 
the error term µ is independent across each panel. The assumption of error term 
independence affects the model’s independent variables by removing the serial 
correlation between the observations and the heteroskedasticity of error terms. The 
results of this estimation technique provide an initial understanding of the relationship 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable. The reason the results 
are a starting point is because the technique assumes the errors are identical and 
independently distributed in var (μ) = δ2 the implication is it is suitable to use ordinary 
least square estimation, but these results have a potential bias.  
 
To overcome the bias of pooled OLS, Torres-Reyna (2007) recommends the use of 
fixed and random effects. Below is a presentation of the regression equation for fixed 
and random effects. 
 
𝑓𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑓𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 
The estimation technique decomposes the error term into two parts; the first is a 
constant unobserved effect denoted by 𝛼𝑖 and the second is a common error term that 
varies across panels denoted by 𝜂𝑖,𝑡 . The difference between the fixed estimation 
technique and the random one relates to the correlation between the unobserved 
variable and independent variables. According to the assumptions of fixed effects 
estimation technique assumes 𝛼𝑖  is correlated with the independent variables. The 
assumption eliminates all time-invariant explanatory variables in the model that cause 
a bias in the estimated coefficients (Schmidheiny, 2016).  
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According to the assumptions of random effects estimation technique 𝛼𝑖  is not 
correlated with the independent variables. The implication of this assumption is time 
variant explanatory variables may be included and analysed in the model. The inclusion 
is in the intercept causing the constant to change across time periods (Schmidheiny, 
2016).  The dissertation relies on the Hausman test to determine the nature of the 
correlation between the unobserved variable and independent variables. 
3.6 Research Reliability 
Conducting three separate panel analyses will ensure the reliability of the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance. The first analysis will use 
ROA as the dependent variable and the second analysis will use ROE as the dependent 
variable. The coefficient and statistical significance will be compared between the two 
analyses to determine the nature of the relationship between corporate governance and 
financial performance. 
 
ROA assesses financial performance from a company viewpoint and ROE from an 
equity investor viewpoint; together the two analyses help to ensure reliability. 
Therefore, relationships that are found to be similar across the two analyses could be 
considered reliable. The data used in the dissertation come from annual reports that are 
verified by an external auditor. The study ensures the validity of the data by using this 
verified information. 
 
3.7 Estimation Technique Validity 
A fixed effects panel regression is performed to determine the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable. The results of the regression are 
tested for time-fixed effects, correlation of residuals, autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. The presence of any one of these four will entail that the regression 
is re-run to control for this presence in the initial analysis. A random effects panel 
regression is performed to determine the relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. The results of the regression are tested for random 
effects, correlation of residuals, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The presence 
of any one of these four will entail that the regression is re-run to control for this 
presence in the initial analysis.  A Hausman test is performed to determine the validity 
of the fixed effects estimation technique for the study. The test is a chi-squared test of 
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the difference between the errors of a fixed and random estimation technique whose 
null hypothesis states a random effects estimation technique is appropriate. 
3.8 Limitations 
The dissertation has at least four limitations. These limitations are in sampling method, 
sample size, sample bias, proxy selection and measurement error. The study’s use of a 
non-probabilistic sampling method may cause a bias in the results because the sample 
is made up of only companies that have no missing data. The study has a small sample 
set because the annual report of private long-term insurance companies in South Africa 
could not be accessed. 
 
All the long-term insurance companies used in the sample adhere to the guidelines 
outlined in the King Report IV. The implication, therefore, is that the study analyses 
how adhering to the King Report IV affects financial performance in South Africa's 
long-term insurance industry. The study uses CEO tenure to determine this executive’s 
likelihood to act as a steward of the company. The variable fails to consider the total 
duration that the individual in the position has been with the company. The importance 
of total company duration arises for CEO’s with a short tenure but long durations. These 
CEOs are likely to act as stewards but a quantitative analysis of the relationship between 
CEO tenure and financial performance is unable to capture this nuance. 
 
The study makes use of secondary data in the form of company annual financial 
statements. Therefore, differences in accounting policies between the companies may 
affect the rates for financial performance between companies. The implication is a 
potential bias in the results from the analysis. Further, the author was not able to access 
the stand-alone financial statements of long-term insurance providers that were in a 
company group structure. In this circumstance, the entire group financial statement was 
used creating a bias in the data because it contains information beyond the long-term 
insurance activities of the represented companies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter has four subsections after the introduction. The first and second are 
presentations of the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the regression 
variables respectively. The third is a presentation of the results from the panel 
regression. The fourth is an interpretation of the results in the context of the long-term 
insurance industry. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The discussion of the descriptive statistics on the table below is limited to two groups. 
The first group contains maximum and minimum values that are three standard 
deviations from the mean. The second group comprises maximum and minimum values 
that are two standard deviations from the mean. The table below presents the descriptive 
statistics; mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and number of the regression 
variables.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Number of 
Observations 
Underwriting Profits (undp) 0.1924 0.1702 -0.1964 1.0104 48 
Return on Assets (roa) 0.0394 0.04820 -0.0004 0.2160 48 
Return on Equity (roe) 0.2243 0.1659 -0.0477 0.5542 48 
Board Size (bs) 14.3125 5.003 7 25 48 
Board Independence (bind) 0.7094 0.1231 0.44 0.8889 48 
Audit Committee Size (acsize) 3.8958 1.0766 3 7 48 
CEO Tenure (ceot) 6.3958 6.4569 1 24 48 
Firm Size (lfs) 18.5176 1.8958 14.7313 20.4021 48 
Reinsurance Usage (riu) 0.1690 0.1935 0.0259 0.7483 48 
Leverage (lev) 0.8675 0.1055 0.5932 0.9919 48 
SOURCE: Authors Estimates in Microsoft Excel for Mac 2011 
The results show that the minimum values of each variable are within three standard 
deviations from their mean. Underwriting profits, board independence and leverage is 
between two and three standard deviations from their respective mean. Whereas, board 
size, audit committee size, CEO tenure and reinsurance usage had maximum values 
between two and three standard deviations from their respective mean. Conversely, 
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underwriting profits and ROA are more than three standard deviations from their mean 
respectively. 
 
Alexander Forbes incurred the minimum underwriting profits highlighted in table 4. 
The company cited insurance claims arising from unexpected weather conditions as the 
driver of underwriting losses during the year (Alexander Forbes, 2013). Discovery had 
the lowest board independence highlighted in table 4. The company had a low score 
because it decided to have 14 of its 25 board members be group executives (Discovery, 
2015). Hollard had the lowest leverage highlighted in table 4. According to the changes 
observed in the company's financial statements a reduction of over 50% in total 
liabilities and a 40% reduction in total assets was the driver for the low leverage 
(Hollard, 2012 and Hollard 2013). 
 
Alexander Forbes incurred the maximum reinsurance usage highlighted in table 4. The 
company improved its mining rehabilitation offering by changing the structure of its 
reinsurance usage (Alexander Forbes, 2013). Discovery had the longest CEO tenure 
highlighted in table 4. The CEO tenure is a result of the company founder staying on in 
the business. Liberty Holdings had the largest audit committee highlighted in table 4. 
The company had the largest committee because it oversaw the retirement and hiring 
of a committee member (Liberty Holdings, 2015). Discovery had the largest board of 
directors as highlighted in table 4. The company has a large board because it elected to 
have 14 executive board members. 
 
Hollard had the highest ROA highlighted in table 4. According to the changes observed 
in the company's financial statements, an increase of over 100% accompanied by a 40% 
decrease in total assets, became the driver for the high ROA (Hollard 2012; Hollard 
2013). Alexander Forbes had the highest underwriting profits highlighted in table 4. 
The company cited an increase in business by 24% as the reason for high underwriting 
profits (Alexander Forbes, 2016). 
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4.3 Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
The discussion of the correlations on the table below is limited to two groups. The first 
group has correlations with values larger than 0.7. The second group has correlations 
between 0.5 and 0.7. Table 5 below presents the correlation matrix for the regression 
variables. 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
 BS BIND ACSIZE CEOT LFS RIU LEV UNDP ROA ROE 
BS 1.0000          
BIND 0.1537 1.0000         
ACSIZE 0.3893 0.6272 1.0000        
CEOT 0.4940 -0.4122 -0.1623 1.0000       
LFS 0.2897 0.4156 0.3211 -0.1974 1.0000      
RIU 0.2088 -0.0484 -0.3578 0.1969 -0.2133 1.0000     
LEV 0.0460 0.3034 0.1743 -0.4737 0.5580 0.1118 1.0000    
UNDP -0.2432 -0.0929 -0.1447 0.0870 -0.1335 -0.0417 -0.3908 1.0000   
ROA -0.2283 -0.3372 -0.1800 0.3624 -0.5925 -0.1915 -0.9310 0.4552 1.0000  
ROE -0.4200 -0.2623 -0.1334 0.1244 -0.5091 -0.3211 -0.6950 0.4520 0.8904 1.0000 
Note: BS=Board Size; BIND=Board Independence; ACSIZE=Audit Committee Size; CEOT=CEO Tenure; LFS=Firm Size; 
RIU=Reinsurance Usage; LEV=Leverage; UNDP=Underwriting Profit; ROA=Return on Assets; ROE=Return on Equity 
SOURCE: Authors Estimation in STATA14  
Leverage and ROA have a correlation greater than 0.7 because both variables make use 
of total assets as a denominator in their computation. The negative relationship between 
the two variables arises from interest payments from long-term liabilities reducing 
after-tax profits. ROE and ROA have a correlation greater than 0.7 because the 
computation of both variables involves the use of after-tax profits as a numerator. 
Additionally, the denominator contains related variables thereby causing dependence 
between ROE and ROA. The positive relationship between the two variables arises 
because directional changes in assets and equity are the same. 
 
ROE and leverage have a correlation between 0.5 and 0.7 because either variable makes 
use of equity and long-term liabilities in their computation. Combined, these two 
variables constitute total assets (Kew & Watson, 2012a). Therefore, the ROE and 
leverage have an inverse relationship. Similarly, audit committee size and board 
independence have a correlation between 0.5 and 0.7. The positive relationship between 
the two variables arises due to the demand for greater transparency, especially in 
companies with higher board independence (Beasley & Petroni, 2001). 
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Leverage and firm size have a correlation between 0.5 and 0.7 because the former uses 
total assets as a denominator while the latter is a mathematical transformation of total 
assets. The negative relationship arises because an increase in total assets decreases 
leverage but increases firm size 
 
ROA and firm size have a correlation between 0.5 and 0.7 because the former is a 
proportion of total assets while the latter is a mathematical transformation of total 
assets. The negative relationship arises because an increase in the asset base requires a 
smaller gain in after-tax profit to increase ROA. Klumpes (2004) shows that smaller 
firms are more productive with the use of assets relative to larger ones. 
 
ROE and firm size have a correlation between 0.5 and 0.7 because the former’s 
denominator is a proportion of total assets and the latter’s is a mathematical 
transformation of total assets. The negative relationship arises because an increase in 
the asset base increases the equity-holders’ claim to assets (Kew & Watson, 2012b). 
The implication is that a smaller increase in after-tax profit is required to increase ROE 
as a firm's asset base increases. Klumpes (2004) shows that smaller firms provide better 
equity returns relative to larger firms. 
 
ROA and leverage have the highest correlation: the two variables are a dependent and 
independent variable respectively. Therefore, there is no need to run a stepwise 
regression. ROE and ROA have the second highest correlation. Both variables are 
dependent variables, therefore, the findings for underwriting profit will be better suited 
to determine the robustness of results.  
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Table 6: Results of Panel Regression 
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
variables 
UNDP ROA ROE 
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
BS -1.221* -2.415* -1.246 -0.646*** -0.0281 -0.585*** -1.146*** -0.615 -1.187*** 
  (0.637) (1.181) (1.225) (0.219) (0.220) (0.171) (0.419) (0.525) (0.203) 
BIND -0.0831 0.854 -0.0642 -0.167 0.0649 -0.150 -0.105 -0.0391 -0.0868 
  (0.467) (0.464) (0.859) (0.160) (0.170) (0.107) (0.307) (0.291) (0.175) 
ACSIZE 1.641 1.507 1.562 1.608 0.00777 1.403* 1.934 -0.147 1.812 
  (3.121) (1.908) (2.160) (1.072) (0.725) (0.813) (2.050) (1.711) (1.335) 
CEOT 0.138 0.560 0.155 0.107 0.223 0.0782 0.149 0.472 0.158 
  (0.489) (0.698) (0.840) (0.168) (0.185) (0.207) (0.321) (0.450) (0.346) 
LFS 0.344 1.128 0.362 -0.0446 -0.126 -0.0591 -0.121 0.951 -0.0948 
  (0.209) (0.836) (0.265) (0.0717) (0.484) (0.117) (0.137) (0.926) (0.188) 
RIU 0.217 -0.166 0.227 -0.0252 0.111 -0.0370 -0.160 -0.0465 -0.143 
  (0.198) (0.268) (0.206) (0.0680) (0.117) (0.0829) (0.130) (0.208) (0.154) 
LEV -0.567*** -1.331** -0.572 -0.867*** -0.393 -0.867*** -0.569*** -0.326 -0.584*** 
  (0.207) (0.552) (0.384) (0.0710) (0.299) (0.100) (0.136) (0.552) (0.179) 
constant 35.88*** 51.69** 36.47*** 51.78*** 31.46*** 50.66*** 54.53*** 21.56 53.60*** 
  (10.57) (17.54) (11.70) (3.630) (4.450) (4.771) (6.945) (11.50) (9.732) 
R-squared 0.264 0.497 0.278 0.913 0.459 0.917 0.682 0.179 0.696 
Hausman test (p-value) 
 
0.0071 
 
0.025 
 
0.054 
LM test (p-value) 
  
1.000 
  
1.000 
  
1.000 
Wald Chi-test (p-value)   0.335   0.000   0.000 
F-stat (p-value) 0.073 0.034  0.000 0.067  0.000 0.891  
Number of Insurers  
 
8 8 
 
8 8 
 
8 8 
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Note: BS=Board size; BIND= Board independence; ACSIZE= Audit committee size; CEOT=CEO tenure; LFS=Firm size; RIU=Reinsurance usage; LEV=Leverage;  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
SOURCE: Authors Estimation in STATA14 
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4.4 Regression Results 
The subsection presents the panel regression results of the effect of corporate 
governance on financial performance in Table 6. The results for underwriting profit, 
ROA and ROE are presented in Models 1 (UNDP), 2 (ROA) and 3 (ROE) respectively. 
The Models are estimated using the pooled OLS, fixed effect and the Rand effects 
estimation technique. 
4.4.1 Model Diagnostics  
The presentation of the results starts with an explanation of the results obtained from 
the panel analysis. The presentation concludes with a selection of results to interpret 
between pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects and a discussion of the fit of the 
model respectively. 
 
The rejection of the null hypothesis in Model 1, 2 and 3 at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively shows the Hausman test indicates the fixed effects model is suitable over 
the random effects model. However, the results in Models 2 and 3 show the random 
effects estimation method provides better explanatory power compared to the fixed 
effects based on the estimated r-squared.  
 
The benefit of a fixed effects model is that it controls for unobserved variables 
correlated to the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2014). The fixed effect result 
allows for unobserved variables with a relationship to underwriting profits to be 
correlated with the independent variables in the model. A test for random effects was 
conducted and showed the model had no random effects.  
 
The results show the fixed effects estimation technique has the best goodness of fit 
using the r-squared measure in Model 1 while Models 2 and 3 are estimated best using 
random effects. However, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test shows none of the three 
models has random effects. The result of the LM test, coupled with the Hausman test, 
leads to the conclusion that the fixed effects estimation technique provides a more 
robust set of coefficients and hence, contain less bias than those from the random effects 
estimation technique. 
 
34 
4.5 Interpretation of Results 
This subsection interprets the results from the previous subsection within the context 
of the long-term insurance industry. The interpretation is in two sections: the first is the 
relationship between corporate governance and the three proxies for financial 
performance. The second interpretation is the relationship between company-specific 
variables and financial performance. 
4.5.1 Corporate Governance Variables and Financial Performance 
Based on the model diagnostics discussed earlier, the discussion of regression results 
will be based on the fixed effects and pooled OLS models. 
 
In Model 1, the coefficient of board size is negatively related to underwriting profit 
under pooled OLS and fixed effects at the 10% level of significance. However, the 
relationship is only significant in Models 2 and 3 in the pooled OLS at the 1% level of 
significance. The result is at odds with the expected result through the lens of resource 
dependence theory. The reason for the negative relationship could be due to insurance 
companies having boards that are too large for the scope of their operations. The impact 
of such an occurrence is that the expertise brought by an additional board member does 
not improve financial performance. Olajide (2013) found board size is positively and 
statistically significantly related to ROA and ROE. The study was carried out in Nigeria 
with an average board size of nine compared to 14 in this research. The smaller board 
size in Olajide (2013) is a potential indication that the average board size of insurance 
companies used in that sample operates before the inflexion point of the resource 
dependence theory. However, Adams and Jiang (2016) also found board size is 
negatively related and statistically significant to financial performance under ROA. The 
study was carried out in the UK with an average board size of seven, lower than that of 
Olajide (2013). The result is a potential indication that a relatively narrow set of 
expertise may be needed to obtain financial performance in insurance companies. 
 
In Model 1, the coefficient of board independence is negatively related to underwriting 
profit under pooled OLS and random effects but positively related under the fixed 
effects. However, these coefficients are not statistically significant, Model 2 had the 
same relationship and statistical significance as Model 1. Model 3 coefficients were 
negative under each estimation technique. The difference in the nature of the 
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relationship between ROA and ROE under fixed effects is unexpected due to the strong 
correlation between the two variables.  
 
Pooled OLS and random effects show a negative statistical relationship with all three 
financial performance measures. The negative relationship between board 
independence and ROE under fixed effects could be due to the dilution of equity 
through share incentive packages offered to directors. The impact of share incentive 
packages is a reduction in the principal-agent problem but causes an increase in 
claimants to company assets. The increase in claimants reduces the return made by 
individual equity holders (Bens, Nagar, Skinner & Wong, 2003). The positive 
relationships observed are in line with the expected result through the lens of agency 
theory. 
 
In Models 1 and 2, the coefficient of audit committee size is positively related to 
underwriting profits under all three estimation techniques. However, these coefficients 
are statistically significant only at the 10% level under random effects in Model 2. 
Model 3 coefficients are positive under pooled OLS and random effects but has a 
negative relationship under fixed effects. The difference in the nature of the relationship 
is unexpected due to the strong correlation between ROA and ROE.  
 
The negative relationship between board independence and ROE under fixed effects 
could be due to the dilution of equity through share incentive packages offered to 
directors on the committee. The impact of share incentive packages is a reduction in 
the principal-agent problem but causes an increase in claimants to company assets. The 
increase in claimants reduces the return made by individual equity holders (Bens et al., 
2003). Pooled OLS shows it has a positive statistical relationship with all three financial 
performance measures. The positive relationships are in line with the expected result 
through the lens of resource dependence theory.  
 
In Models 1, 2 and 3, the coefficient of CEO tenure is positively related to financial 
performance. The reason for the positive relationship could be the hiring of company 
insiders to the position of CEO. The benefit of hiring company insiders is that the risk 
of the CEOs making decisions to enrich themselves at the expense of the company is 
reduced (Allgood & Farrell, 2003). The impact of decision-making that benefits the 
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company is a positive relationship between CEO tenure and financial performance, as 
highlighted in table 5, and is a realisation of stakeholder theory. 
4.5.2 Control Variables and Financial Performance 
The interpretation considers the results obtained from the fixed effects and pooled OLS 
models respectively. The reason behind excluding random effects is the absence of 
random effects in the model. The structure of the interpretation is as follows: one, a 
statistical interpretation of the result; two, a comparison of the result to the expected 
result; three, a contextual explanation; and four, a comparison of results research result 
to existing literature. 
 
In Model 1, the coefficient of leverage is negatively related to underwriting profit under 
pooled OLS and fixed effects at the 1% and 5% level of statistical significance 
respectively. However, in Models 2 and 3, the coefficients are statistically significant 
under pooled OLS and random effects at the 1% level of statistical significance.  
 
The reasons behind the downside pressure on financial performance highlighted by 
Alexander Forbes (2015) are low economic, labour force and equity market growth in 
South Africa. The impact of leverage, in this case, was to augment the downward 
pressure, hence yielding the negative relationship. A study conducted by Adams and 
Jiang (2016) uncovered a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
financial performance using ROA and ROE and leverage. The study was carried out in 
Kenya using a sample of two companies. The small sample size makes it inappropriate 
to have expected the same result because the positive relationship observed could have 
been specific to those two firms. 
 
In Model 1, the coefficient of firm size is positively related to underwriting profits 
under all three estimation techniques. However, these coefficients are not statistically 
significant. In Model 2, the coefficient of firm size is negatively related to ROA under 
all three estimation techniques. However, the coefficients are not statistically 
significant. In Model 3, the coefficient of firm size is negatively related to ROA under 
pooled OLS and random effects but positively related under fixed effects. However, the 
coefficients are not statistically significant.  
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The difference in the nature of the relationship in Models 2 and 3 under fixed effects is 
unexpected due to the strong correlation between ROA and ROE. The negative 
relationship between firm size and ROA and ROE arises because both these measures 
of financial performance consider performance after total enterprise costs, unlike 
underwriting profits that focuses exclusively on reinsurance costs. The positive 
relationships are in line with the expected result through the lens of economies of scale.  
 
In Model 1, the coefficient of reinsurance usage is positively related to underwriting 
profits under pooled OLS and random effects but negatively related under fixed effects. 
However, these coefficients are not statistically significant. In Model 2, the coefficients 
are negatively related to ROE under pooled OLS and random effects but positively 
related under fixed effects. However, these coefficients are not statistically significant. 
In Model 3, the coefficients are negatively related under all three estimation techniques. 
However, these coefficients are not statistically significant. 
 
The difference in the nature of the relationship in Models 2 and 3 under fixed effects is 
unexpected due to the strong correlation between the variables. The negative 
relationship between ROE and underwriting profits under fixed effects arises due to a 
reduction in profitability. Reinsurance usage reduces profitability by reducing net 
premiums. The lower net premium means equity holders have a claim to lower profits 
and the profitability of underwriting services falls adversely, affecting ROE and 
underwriting profits respectively. The positive relationships are in line with the 
expected result through the lens of reducing the insured's claim on assets after a trigger 
event.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The chapter has three subsections after the introduction. The first subsection is a 
summary and the conclusions of the study. The second is a policy recommendation 
based on the results of the study. Finally, potential avenues of future research based on 
the dissertation’s findings are presented. 
5.2 Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of the dissertation was to determine if corporate governance and company-
specific variables affect the financial performance of long-term insurance providers in 
South Africa. The research was conducted using a panel regression analysis using eight 
companies for the period 2011 to 2016. The sample accounted for over 94% of the 
assets held by the sector according to KPMG (2018). 
 
The results from the study showed board size and leverage are negatively and 
significantly related to financial performance in South Africa’s long-term insurance 
industry. The finding with regard to board size was unexpected because resource 
dependence theory suggests larger boards are positively related to financial 
performance. Olajide (2013) and Najjar (2012) support the conclusion of this theory 
and it is highlighted in this study by the positive relationship between audit committee 
size and financial performance. 
 
The finding with regard to leverage was not unexpected because executive teams in the 
sector have the flexibility to independently determine the degree of leverage in their 
companies. The observed negative relationship was due to the adverse economic 
conditions highlighted by Alexander Forbes (2015) of low economic growth, labour 
force and equity market growth that augmented poor financial performance. 
 
The significant unexpected finding from the study was that board independence, audit 
committee size and CEO tenure did not have a statistically significant relationship with 
financial performance. The finding was due to each company in the sample following 
the guidelines outlined in the King Report IV on Corporate Governance. Therefore, all 
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the companies have similar governance structures. Board size was found to be 
statistically significant because the King Report IV on Corporate Governance does not 
make a recommendation on the maximum size of a company’s board. The explanation 
would imply that audit committee size would also have to be statistically significant 
because there is also no recommendation made on its size. The logical extension does 
not apply to the audit committee because its size is a function of the size of the board 
of directors, therefore, its impact is observed through the size of the board. 
 
The application of the recommendations outlined in the King Report IV on Corporate 
Governance by each company in the sample had an impact on the results. The effect 
was board size was the only corporate governance variable that was statistically 
significantly related to financial performance. The negative relationship may indicate 
that the size of the boards of directors in the sector is too large or that these directors 
do not bring the required expertise to their companies. 
5.3 Policy Recommendations  
The study found board size and leverage to be the only variables with a statistically 
significant relationship to financial performance. The findings lead to policy 
recommendations around the King Report IV, board size requirements and regulation 
of the South African long-term insurance industry. 
 
The results show that guidelines on corporate governance outlined in the King Report 
IV do not cause any distortions to financial performance in the sector. The guidelines 
help to ensure transparency in the affairs of the organisations that implement them 
through effective and ethical leadership. The importance of transparency in the long-
term insurance industry is that it allows the insured to assess the ability of the insurer 
to meet their claims should they arise. Based on the results of the study, the dissertation 
recommends that the guidelines on corporate governance in the King Report IV become 
statutory for long-term insurance providers in South Africa. 
 
The results show that board size has a negative and statistically significant relationship 
with financial performance in the sector. There is currently no guideline or regulation 
in South Africa on the maximum number of board members which a long-term 
insurance provider is permitted to have. The dissertation recommends a board size 
40 
ceiling to address the negative impact of larger boards on financial performance in the 
sector. The recommendation can be made through the IoD in the King Report IV due 
to its credibility on corporate governance. 
 
The results show that leverage has a negative and statistically significant relationship 
with financial performance in the sector. There is currently no guideline or regulation 
in South Africa on the maximum level of permitted leverage (Government Gazette, 
2018). The research recommends a leverage ceiling to address the negative impact of 
high levels of leverage on financial performance in the sector. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision's (2001) Basel accord, which sets a guideline on the level of risk 
exposure banks should have, has influenced this recommendation. The justification for 
using this influence is insurance companies are a constituent of the unregulated 
'shadow' banking sector (Luo, 2018). 
5.4 Avenues for Future Research 
The findings of the research open avenues for research to understand the relationship 
between corporate governance variables and financial performance in the South African 
long-term insurance sector. The paths for further research arise from the results and 
research design. 
 
The results can lead to further research to determine the number of board members and 
the level of leverage that will optimise the financial performance of long-term insurance 
providers in South Africa. The research would provide empirical evidence to implement 
the second and third policy recommendations made by the dissertation respectively. 
Additionally, a study that uses financial and operational leverage to investigate their 
relationship with financial performance can be carried out. A study in this area would 
provide better information required to implement the third recommendation made by 
the dissertation. Further, the KPMG long-term insurance industry survey which showed 
the four companies controlling 94% of the assets in its 18 companies, and the finding 
of Boakye (2018) that the industry is only 21% efficient, suggests a study similar study 
to the one carried out by Alhassan, Addison and Asamoah (2015) may need to be 
carried out in South Africa. The purpose of such a study would be to get policy-makers 
to understand the structure of the long-term insurance industry in order for them to put 
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in place adequate policies to improve the efficiency of the industry without reducing its 
profitability. 
 
Research design leads to further research to determine the impact of the application of 
the guidelines of the King Report IV in South Africa's long-term insurance sector and 
how corporate governance variables affect a company's profit efficiency. A study to 
conduct the first path described would involve a cross-border comparison of the 
relationship investigated in this dissertation by using a country that has no formal 
corporate governance framework and South Africa. The results from such a study 
would have a higher accuracy because it mimics a randomised control trial where the 
South African countries are the control group. The second path described would involve 
the creation of a profit efficiency score by using a DEA and entailing a regression of 
the score against corporate governance variables. The results from such a study would 
provide a nuanced view of the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance in South Africa's long-term insurance sector because it analyses drivers 
for the change in profitability. To overcome the limitation of the small sample size 
faced in this study, future research should request the annual reports from a larger 
sample of FSB-accredited long-term insurance companies.  
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APPENDIX 
List of Sampled Long-term Insurance Companies  
Name of Company 
Alexandre Forbes 
Clientele Life Assurance 
Discovery 
Hollard 
Liberty Life 
MMI Holdings* 
Old Mutual 
Sanlam 
*The consolidation of Momentum and Metropolitan Insurance that are registered separately with the 
Financial Services Board 
